Abstract-We formulate two coordination mechanisms between local and centralized electricity markets. The first one is a centralized mechanism ruled by the national market operator and formulated as a standard constrained optimization problem. The second one is a decentralized mechanism, governed by local market operators that interact with a central market operator. In both cases, conventional generators submit block quantity offers subject to inter-temporal constraints while anticipating the outcome of the market clearing(s). The decentralized coordination mechanism can be interpreted as a Stackelberg game that we formulate as a bilevel mathematical programming problem. We prove that in case of simple bids, the Stackelberg game admits a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and extend this result to block quantity offers using Complementarity Theory. Through a case study we determine that the decentralized design is as efficient as the centralized one with high shares of renewables, using the Price of Anarchy as performance measure, and that imperfect information has a limited impact on the performance of the decentralized market design.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) may offer new sources of flexibility, which may allow system operators to cost-effectively mitigate the impact of variable and unpredictable generation from Renewable Energy Sources (RES). However, contracting DER-based generation in a centralized market structure may complicate market clearing procedures due to the amount and complexity of the bids and the associated coordination requirements between market parties. The goal of this article is to compare the efficiency of two coordination mechanisms: a centralized market, coordinated by a single market operator and a decentralized market structure, governed by a number of local market operators.
In a centralized market, a coordinating market operator contracts DER directly from DER owners connected to the distribution grid, possibly by the intermediate of an aggregator. Such a centralized market can be formulated as a standard optimization problem under network constraints. On the contrary, in a local market structure, a market operator at the local (e.g. distribution) level matches DER-based generation and local demand. Interactions between local markets may be managed by a centralized market operator. As a consequence, resources connected to the distribution grid can only be offered to a centralized market via local markets, taking into account the network constraints. Such hierarchical market structures, in which market operators (the agents) have conflicting interests while sharing network constraints belong to the stream of literature called networked Stackelberg competition [12] .
Stackelberg games are hierarchical games involving a leader and a follower. The leader takes the follower's optimal reaction into account when optimizing his strategy. Such games are traditionally formulated as bilevel optimization problems [5] . Extensions to multi-leader follower games in which a collection of leaders compete in a non-cooperative game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another non-cooperative game amongst the followers is still considered as a challenging problem in the optimization and game theory communities [5] . However, several applications of multi-leader follower games can be found in the electricity market literature. In [6] , we provided a multi-agent based representation of suppliers that interact in geographic demand markets, organized as twotiered systems. Assuming rational expectation of the agents with respect to the outcome of the market, existence and uniqueness of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are investigated. Strategic behavior of agents has also been considered in [2] , [10] . In these papers, the authors considered respectively a strategic power producer and an aggregator that bid in the dayahead electricity market with the objective to maximize profit and minimize charging costs, while anticipating the outcome of the market clearing and the behavior of rival producers and consumers. Dedicated reformulations are required to solve these multi-leader follower games [1] . This paper is a first step towards a more standardized multi-leader follower game representation and the development of appropriate methods to solve them, in the context of electrical engineering problems.
In this article, we consider a stylized model of centralized and local markets where the bids take the form of either simple quantity offers or block quantity offers. We aim at (i) providing a system model in Section II that we formulate as a mathematical programming problem in Subsections III-A and III-B, (ii) characterizing the existence and uniqueness of solutions in a local market structure in Subsection III-C, (iii) quantifying the efficiency of local electricity markets with high shares of renewables, with respect to the centralized market design using the Price of Anarchy as performance measure (Subsection IV-A). Finally, a case study is provided in Subsections IV-B and IV-C to quantify the impact of the share of RES-based generation on the local market efficiency and on the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
II. MARKET STRUCTURE AND AGENTS

A. Agents
We consider a local market that is cleared at each time period t ∈ {0, ..., t H − 1} over a finite time horizon t H ∈ N * , the local market operator taking into account local network 978-1-5090-5499-2/17/$31.00 c 2017 IEEE constraints, and on which conventional generators, consumers and renewable producers interact. The local market operators reports the cleared quantities to the centralized market operator who is responsible for the operation of the global market. We now describe in more details the various categories of agents involved.
Local market operator: in each local market zone k ∈ {1, ..., n} and at each time period t ∈ {0, ..., t H − 1}, there is a local market operator that clears the local market which is composed of one aggregated conventional (nuclear, gas, coal, etc.) generator G k , one aggregated renewable producer and consumers.
Generators: G k submits a quantity offer q k ∈ R t H + and incurs a production cost
c k q k (t) for q k , where the cost function c k : R + → R + is assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and convex with c k (0) = 0. The block bids of the generators are subject to inter-temporal constraints Φ(q k ) ≤ 0 where Φ : R t H + → R m is continuous, bijective and increasing 1 in q k and m ∈ N * is the number of inter-temporal constraints that are considered. Generators may also have RES-based generation in their portfolio, which is also offered to the market. We assume a zero marginal cost for the RES production and denoteŵ k (t) as the forecasted RES-based generation in market zone k ∈ {1, ..., n}, at time period t ∈ {0, ..., t H − 1}.
Consumers: we assume that the aggregated consumption in each local market zone k is represented with an inverse demand function p k : R + → R + that specifies how much the aggregate consumer is willing to pay to consume one more unit of electrical energy. d k (t) is the aggregated demand in market zone k ∈ {1, ..., n}, at time period t. We assume a linear relation between price and aggregated demand
Central market operator: the central market operator determines the exchanges between different market zones r(t) ∈ X n . Note that for all k ∈ {1, ..., n}, −r k (t) denotes the net injection into market zone k, at time period t. These exchanges are determined according to a market mechanism that maximizes the social welfare while guaranteeing supply and demand balance in each market zone. Exchanges, r(t), are constrained by the available transmission capacity between market zones.
B. Timing of the game and utility functions of the agents
Demand and supply balance in each local market k ∈ {1, ..., n} and each time period t ∈ {0, ..., t H − 1} implies that d k (t) = q k (t) +ŵ k (t) + r k (t), which implies in turn that
We model a nodal pricing mechanism which properly rewards DERs.
Depending on the market coordination mechanism, the strategic interactions between the agents is either modeled as a standard constrained optimization problem (centralized market) or as a Stackelberg game (local markets). The Stackelberg game takes place as follows:
1) Each conventional generator G k , k ∈ {1, ..., n}, chooses independently and simultaneously his block bid, q k , to maximize his profit, anticipating the local and centralized market clearing.
2) At each time period t ∈ {0, ..., t H −1}, each local market operator clears the local market and announces the price p k q k (t) +ŵ k (t) + r k (t) to the conventional generator G k and the consumers. Subsequently, the central market operator chooses the exchanges between markets, r(t), that maximize the global social welfare.
On the contrary, in the centralized market structure, we assume that there is no anticipation at the generators' side and that the central market operator optimizes simultaneously the production quantities (q k ) k=1,...,n and the exchanges between zones r(t)
in order to maximize the social welfare. We now detail the utility functions of the agents involved in the Stackelberg game. At time period t ∈ {0, ..., t H − 1}, the conventional generator G k is paid according to the local nodal price p k q k (t) +ŵ k (t) + r k (t) . We define the profit of G k at t as the difference between the revenue generated by selling q k (t) units at market price p k (t) and the cost of producing these units
The central market operator's objective coincides with social welfare maximization, which is defined as the maximization of the sum of the surplus of consumers and producers (here, conventional generators, renewable producers) and the centralized market operator's profit SW q(t), r(t),ŵ(t) = n k=1
III. MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING FORMULATION
A. A standard optimization problem for the centralized market
In the centralized market coordination scheme, we assume that the central market operator balances supply and demand by optimizing exchanges, r k (t), between zones k ∈ {1, ..., n}, and the quantities produced by the conventional generators under non-negativity and inter-temporal constraints. The centralized market is here modeled as a one-level standard optimization problem under constraints on the quantity bids (nonnegativity, inter-temporality) as well as the balance of demand and supply in each market zone, subject to constraints on the exchanges between zones max (q(t)) pating central coordination
In the local market coordination structure, the central market operator optimizes only the exchanges to guarantee the aggregated supply and demand balance. Conventional generators declare simultaneously and independently quantity offers in the local market. The local market is modeled as a Stackelberg game where local market operators act as leaders, with the central market operator as a follower. It is therefore formulated as a bilevel mathematical programming problem, where the local market operators maximize the social welfare in their market zone, subject to inter-temporal constraints on the block quantity offers, while anticipating the outcome of the central market clearing. However, if we assume that (i) the demand in each zone is inflexible, and (ii) generator bid at marginal cost, the objective of the local market operator simplifies to maximizing the profit of the generators. Formally, for all k = 1, ..., n, the bilevel optimization problem writes down as
For all t = 0, ..., t H − 1,
As classical in bilevel optimization, the lower-level problem in Equations (8) and (9) is nested within the upper-level problem described by Equations (4)- (7) . The variables are divided into two classes, namely the lower-level variables r(t) ∈ X and the upper-level variables q k ∈ R t H , ∀k = 1, ..., n. At the upper-level, Equation (5) imposes non-negativity of the bid quantity submitted by G k and Equation (6) captures the inter-temporality constraints associated with bid q k . At the lower-level, Equation (9) captures the fact that the sum of the exchanges between market zones, r(t) ∈ X , vanishes at each time period t ∈ {0, ..., t H − 1}, by definition of the space X . Equation (9) can easily be reformulated as an equation which represents demand and supply equilibrium i.e., 
C. Solving the bilevel mathematical program
The inverse demand function p k : R + → R + is linear (a fortiori concave) and strictly decreasing in q k . Hence p 
For D to be well-defined and strictly decreasing and concave (as the sum of such functions), we make the assumption that the price intercepts are identical [12] i.e., a k = a, ∀k = 1, ..., n. Under this assumption, we can properly introduce the inverse demand function D −1 : R + →] − ∞; a] which is strictly decreasing and concave.
Proposition 1: In case of simple bids (i.e., t H = 1) and identical price intercepts, the equilibrium q (ŵ), r (ŵ) solution of the Stackelberg game described by Equations (4)- (9) coincides with the social welfare optimum of a noncooperative game between the n conventional generators.
Proof of Proposition 1. For the sake of simplicity, we omit the t index. We start by computing a reaction function, ρ, solution of the lower-level optimization problem. For any fixed
. By definition of the reaction function, ρ, Equations (8) and (9) can be rewritten
s.t.
The constraints r ∈ X and n k=1 r k = 0 are implicitly included in Equation (12) and in the definition of the Φ function. Note that
Hence the objective function in Equation (11) is strictly concave. This implies that the lower-level equivalent problem described by Equations (11) and (12) admits a unique solution d (q,ŵ), and that there exists a unique reaction function, ρ .
We now introduce the Lagrangian function associated with Equations (11) and (12) 
k , where λ ∈ R is the Lagrange multiplier associated with lower-level constraint (9) .
Taking the partial derivative of L(d, λ) with respect to d k , we obtain
By summation over k = 1, ..., n and definition of the market demand introduced in Equation (10), we obtain: D(λ) = n k=1 d k . Using Equation (12) , it can be rewritten: D(λ) = n k=1 q k + n k=1ŵ k . From which we infer
By substitution of Equation (14) in Equation (13), we obtain
From which we infer the reaction function, ρ , closed form expression, and substitute it in the upper-level optimization problem objective function
using Equation (15). We observe that Equation (16) becomes independent of the lower-level reaction function ρ (q,ŵ). As a result, an equilibrium of the Stackelberg game is also an equilibrium of a corresponding non-cooperative game involving the n conventional generators and
Tŵ as inverse demand function.
For the sake of simplicity, in the following we set Q := 1 T q −k + q k + 1 Tŵ . We now introduce an intermediate result on the generators' profit functions.
Lemma 1:
is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave with respect to own output q k . Proof of Lemma 1. It is based on the concavity and striclty decreasingness of D −1 . Due to the page limit, it is omitted. Proposition 2: Assuming that there are no inter-temporal constraints, we prove that the Stackelberg game described by Equations (4)- (9) is equivalent to a non linear Complementarity Problem.
Proof of Proposition 2. For simple bids, the absence of intertemporal constraints means that Φ ≡ 0. It is well-known that the set of Nash equilibria is the same as the set of simultaneous solutions of the first-order optimality conditions of the n individual generators' problems [12] . For all k = 1, ..., n, we have to solve simultaneously
This system of equations can be reformulated as a non linear
where we set Ψ q,ŵ := Ψ 1 q,ŵ , ..., Ψ n q,ŵ . The generators' objective functions π G k q k , q −k , ρ (q,ŵ),ŵ being twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave with respect to q k for all k ∈ {1, ..., n} according to Lemma 1, Kolstad and Mathiesen proved in [4] that finding a Nash equilibrium, q , is equivalent to find q ∈ CP (R n + , Ψ).
We now try to generalize this result in case where intertemporal constraints hold. In the case of simple bids, this means that Φ ≡ 0. Let introduce the set K := q ∈ R n + |Φ(q k ) ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n} . First, we check that
m is closed as a reciprocal image of a closed subset of R m through a continuous application. By definition, K is a bounded subset of R n . Since compacts in R n are in general the closed and bounded subsets, we have proved that K is compact in R n + . We now prove some properties of the Ψ vector. Lemma 2: ∇Ψ is a Hadamard matrix [8] if, and only if
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting p
Proposition 3: In the case of simple bids, the Stackelberg game described by Equations (4)-(9) admits a unique equilibrium provided Equation (17) holds.
Proof of Proposition 3. We checked in Lemma 1 that each generator G k profit function is twice differentiable and strictly concave with respect to q k and, in Lemma 2, that ∇Ψ is a Hadamard matrix if, and only if, Equation (17) holds. Following [7] , there exists at most one solution to CP (R n + , Ψ). This proves the uniqueness of q . We now deal with existence.
Let q ∈ R n + \ K, then there exist at least one k ∈ {1, ..., n}
of q and construction of y. Following [3] this proves that if Equation (17) holds, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative game between the generators, that we call q (ŵ).
Proposition 4:
In the case of block bids, there exists a unique equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg game described by Equations (4)- (9), provided Equation (17) holds at each time period t ∈ {0, ..., t H − 1}.
Proof of Proposition 4. We proceed by extending the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3. The continuity and strict concavity of
, r(t),ŵ(t) is straightforward as the sum of functions having this property. The assumption that there are no inter-temporal constraints is straightforward to relax and extend to block bids since the upper-level problem in Equations (4), (5), (7) can be decomposed into independent problems over the temporal space 0, ..., t H − 1. In case where inter-temporal constraints are introduced, Lemma 2 can be extended to prove that ∇Ψ q(t),ŵ(t) is a Hadamard matrix at any time period t ∈ {0, ..., t H − 1}. The end of Proposition 3 proof is straightforward to extend to block bids by observing that
as the product of closed sets, and that (q − y)
. Then, following the same procedure as above, it is possible to construct vectors
We have proved that the Stackelberg game admits a unique solution under constraints on the local quantity offers. We now want to quantify the impact of these constraints and anticipation on the centralized market design, based on a performance measure called the Price of Anarchy (PoA).
IV. CASE STUDY
We consider two market zones. Each generator has a quadratic cost function i.e., c k (q k ) = c k q 2 k , ∀k = 1, 2. We study one time period and only simple bids are considered.
A. Quantifying efficiency
The PoA is defined as the ratio between the optimal social welfare and that of the worst value of an equilibrium [9] :
. The PoA is a measure of the efficiency loss when introducing anticipatory behavior through (decentralized) local markets, compared with the centralized market design. The higher the PoA, the higher the loss caused by anticipatory behavior.
B. Computing solutions for centralized and local markets
In the proposed case study, the social welfare can be expressed analytically as SW(q, r,ŵ)
Using this equation, we derive solutions for the centralized market and local market coordination.
1) Centralized market: In the centralized market organization, the market operator determines simultaneously the quantities produced by the generators (q c k ) k=1,2 and the exchanges between zones r c . Derivating the social welfare function with respect to each of these variables, we obtain a linear system of equations which admits a unique solution:
.
2) Local markets:
We proceed by backward induction, i.e., we start by solving the lower-level optimization problem with respect to r assuming that the generators' quantities q 1 , q 2 are fixed. We obtain the analytical expression of the reaction function ρ (q,ŵ) = a1+a2−b1q1−b1ŵ1−b2q2−b2ŵ2 b1+b2
. By substitution of the reaction function in the upper-level equations (4)- (7) and derivation with respect to q 1 and q 2 respectively, we obtain q k (ŵ) = 3a
In the numerical section, we want to highlight the impact of transmission line capacity, local generation capacities and RES-based generation on the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the Stackelberg game. The impacts of RES-based generations and distortions caused by imperfect information are also quantitatively assessed.
C. Numerical illustrations
We assume that there is a single transmission line that interconnects the local markets, with a finite capacity. In Fig. 1a , we have represented the feasibility regions for both market designs at optimum (left)/equilibrium (right), as functions of RES-based generations with free capacity line. If this latter is set to an arbitrary value (for example, 5), the set of RESbased generation for which there is an optimum/equilibrium is the subspace of R 2 + located just above the magenta line. We observe that this subspace is slightly wider for the decentralized design than for the centralized one, due to the sequentiality introduced in the computation of the strategy in the first design. We assume in addition that capacity constraints hold on each local market. In Fig. 1b we have represented the output of the Stackelberg game as a function of RESbased generation in each local market, taking into account the finite transmission line capacity and local generation capacity constraints. The magenta area delineates the set ofŵ 1 and w 2 for which equilibrium exists. We observe that equilibrium satisfying finite transmission line capacity and local capacity constraints might exist only for high RES shares. Otherwise, unstable behaviors will be observed which would be in favor of a more centralized design.
We now want to quantify the impact of the RES-based generation,ŵ 1 andŵ 2 , on the PoA. The parameters are set as follows a 1 = a 2 = 8, share their estimated RES-based generation with all the market operators (both local and global), something for which they might have no a priori incentives. To check whether forecast information sharing might be profitable, we assume that each local market operator k = 1, 2 makes the estimate that β kŵl , l = 1, 2, l = k renewable power is produced on the other local market, with β k ≥ 0 a distortion factor. We have represented the PoA as a function of the distortion factors in Fig. 2b , assuming that the estimated renewable productions on each local market are set so thatŵ 1 = 8 andŵ 2 = 10, and that under centralized market design, perfect information holds. We observe in Fig. 2b that for distortion factors smaller than 3, imperfect information has little impact on the PoA, which stays close to one. Similarly, Gonzalez and Andersson showed that even with simple mechanisms to guess the bids of other market participants, results close to a perfect information benchmark can be achieved [2] .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have modeled interactions between local and global market operators through two coordination schemes: a centralized one, formulated as a standard constrained optimization problem, and a decentralized one, formulated as a Stackelberg game. We have quantified the loss of efficiency caused by anticipation through the PoA. We have proved that the Stackelberg game, modeled as a bilevel program, can be reformulated as a non linear Complementarity Problem that admits a unique Nash Equilibrium under a set of constraints on the quantity offers. A case study highlights the impact of transmission line and local generation capacities and RES-based generation, on the existence of a Nash equilibrium. The impact of RES-based generation and distortions caused by imperfect information on the PoA are also quantitatively assessed.
